Optimal Network Compression by Amini, Hamed & Feinstein, Zachary
Optimal Network Compression
Hamed Amini ∗ Zachary Feinstein †
August 21, 2020
Abstract
This paper introduces a formulation of the optimal network compression problem for financial
systems. This general formulation is presented for different levels of network compression or
rerouting allowed from the initial interbank network. We prove that this problem is, generically,
NP-hard. We focus on objective functions generated by systemic risk measures under systematic
shocks to the financial network. We conclude by studying the optimal compression problem for
specific networks; this permits us to study the so-called robust fragility of certain network
topologies more generally as well as the potential benefits and costs of network compression.
Keywords: Systemic risk, financial networks, portfolio compression, genetic algorithm.
1 Introduction
The financial crisis 2007-2009 has highlighted the importance of network structure on the am-
plification of the initial shock to the level of the global financial system, leading to an economic
recession. In response to market dysfunctions, the US congress enacted the largest regulations of
financial market, in the form of the "Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act" of 2010, to ensure financial stability and reduce systemic risk. Among the regulations is
that the majority of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives should be centrally cleared so as to
reduce counterparty risk and ensure financial stability. Portfolio compression is another way to
modify the financial network structure. Several parties in the network enter into a multi-lateral
netting agreement to essentially reduce the gross exposures while keeping the net positions un-
changed. The main provider of such systems is TriOptima [41], who have compressed over $1.7
trillion in gross notional.
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For the purposes of this paper we consider a known initial finite network of obligations
over which we seek an “optimal” network compression. This is in contrast to the random
graph structure considered in [2,24,29]. Though the initial network compression formulation is
presented without consideration of the network clearing procedure, we will primarily focus on
clearing based on [23,40]. Under the DebtRank [10,11] clearing, a version of the optimal network
compression problem as a mixed integer linear program was proposed in [20]. Other notions of
contagion could be added to our clearing problem as well, e.g., portfolio overlap [4,17,25]; such
additional avenues of contagion would influence the systemic risk and may impact the optimal
compression. We focus on the Eisenberg-Noe framework so as to remain in a, relatively, simple
setting.
The optimal compression problem is related to studies in many other works in the Eisenberg-
Noe clearing framework. For instance, the compression constraints can be viewed as the feasibil-
ity conditions for a network reconstruction problem; [7,30,31,35,42] propose methods to sample
either deterministically or stochastically from this feasible region. [1] considered the optimal
rerouting problem of a system of identical banks under i.i.d. Bernoulli shocks. That work found
that the completely connected system has a “robust fragility” property, i.e., it is the most stable
for small shocks but the least stable for large shocks (and vice versa for the ring network). [27]
studies the sensitivity of the Eisenberg-Noe clearing payments w.r.t. the relative liability ma-
trix; that work uses these sensitivities in order to find the best and worst case directions for
rerouting of the liability network. [12] utilizes majorization of the financial networks in order to
guarantee the relative health of two financial networks (w.r.t. the number of defaulting banks).
The network compression is also related to the literature on analyzing consequences of different
netting mechanisms in centrally cleared financial markets; see, e.g., [3, 5, 6, 8, 13,18,21,22,32].
We are primarily motivated in this study by two streams of literature: that of [1] which
proposed the robust fragility of the completely connected network and those of [19, 43] which
proposed frameworks for network compression without regards for the impact on systemic risk.
In this paper we seek to unify these problems into a single optimization framework, which we call
optimal network compression. We further merge these problems with the systemic risk measures
of [15, 38] so as to determine the compressed network that minimizes systemic risk; as shown
in [43], network compression need not improve systemic risk.
The primary innovations and results of this paper are in multiple directions. First, we prove
that the optimal network compression problem is generically NP-hard. This motivates us to
consider a machine learning approach to approximating the optimal financial network. Second,
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as in [9], we consider stress scenarios under systematic shocks. These stress scenarios allow us
to analytically compute the systemic risk measures we wish to minimize; this removes the need
for Monte Carlo simulations in the computation of the objective of our optimal compression
problem. In particular, this framework allows us to numerically generalize the results of [1]
to consider the optimal rerouting problem and [43] to quantify the suboptimality of the full
compression as utilized in [19].
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we propose the general optimal
network compression problem to be considered throughout this work. In so doing, we formulate
four meaningful types of “compression” problems motivated by [1,19] and prove that the optimal
compression problem is, generically, NP-hard given each of those constraint sets. We then focus
on a meaningful form for the objective function, namely the systemic risk measures of [15, 38],
in Section 3. Specifically, in Section 3.2, we present analytical forms for specific examples of
these systemic risk measures under systematic shocks to the financial system. This is followed
by two case studies in Section 4. First, we consider a simple three bank system that serves
the dual purposes of validating our algorithmic approach as well as testing the results of [1] in
heterogeneous system with systematic shocks. Second, we study a network calibrated to the
2011 European Banking Authority dataset; with this network we study the improvements in
systemic risk via optimal compression and “maximal” compression (i.e., as proposed in [19]).
Section 5 concludes.
2 The optimization problem
Throughout this work we will consider a system of n banks with obligations Lij ≥ 0 from bank
i to j; as is typical, we assume Lii = 0 for every bank i, i.e., no bank has any obligations
to itself. Additionally, each bank i will be assumed to have liabilities external to the banking
network Li0 ≥ 0. These external obligations are sometimes called societal obligations; we will
interchangeably use these terms throughout this work. The set of all such networks is denoted
by L := {L ∈ Rn×(n+1)+ | Lii = 0 ∀i}.
In this section we present the primary optimization problem of interest in this work. To
do so we introduce the notion of portfolio compression which we take from [19]. In this work
we seek to find the optimal network compression problem, i.e., for an initial liability network
L˜ ∈ L, we wish to minimize some objective f : L → R.
min
{
f(L) | L ∈ C(L˜)
}
. (1)
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The objective function f can be directly computed from the network statistics (e.g., network
entropy) or the results of systemic risk measures (see, e.g., [15, 38]). Note that in general this
function may also depend on the initial liability network f(L) = f(L; L˜), but we drop this from
the notation for compactness. We will discuss the systemic risk measure based objective func-
tions in the following sections. Notably, as these objective functions are in general nonconvex,
this optimization problem might be hard; in fact, we will show that (generically) this problem
is NP-hard given certain objectives and network compression based constraints in Theorem 2.4.
Remark 2.1. Prior works on network compression, e.g., [19], focus on removing the maximal
amount of liabilities in the system subject to certain financial constraints. That is, with objective
f(L) :=
∑n
i=1
∑n+1
j=1 Lij . In particular, with the compression constraints highlighted within this
work, (1) becomes a linear programming problem and can be solved in polynomial time. Other,
non-optimization based, algorithms for undertaking this compression are presented in [19]. In
contrast, we are motivated, as in [43], to study partial compression to determine the optimal level
of compression; [43] focuses on conservative compression (defined below) with a strict definition
for optimality related to the set of defaulting banks.
The constraint set C(L˜) denotes the set of all possibly compressed or rerouted networks
consistent with L˜. Any such meaningful compression problem satisfies two properties: consistent
net liabilities and feasibility as a network. This is encoded in the following definition consistent
with prior works on network compression, e.g., [19, 43].
Definition 2.2. Given an initial financial liability network L˜ ∈ L, C(L˜) is a set of compressed
networks if L ∈ C(L˜) implies:
• constant net liabilities: ∑nj=1[Lij − Lji] + Li0 = ∑nj=1[L˜ij − L˜ji] + L˜i0 for every bank
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
• feasibility: L ∈ L.
Compare the definition of the set of compressed networks to the General Compression Prob-
lem defined in [19]. We wish to note that the set of compressed networks can often be defined as
a convex polyhedron; in fact it is explicitly defined this way in [19] and every specific example
we consider in this work follow satisfy such a structure.
Example 2.3. In this example we consider 3 types of network compression and, fourth, the
rerouting problem, which we will consider throughout this work. These 3 network compression
problems are detailed in [19] with conservative compression studied further in [43]. We describe
these compression problems in varying order from most to least restrictive; though each is
4
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Figure 1: Example of bilateral compression with µ1 ∈ [0, 1], µ2 ∈ [0, 2] and µ3 ∈ [0, 3].
financially meaningful, other types of compression can be implemented. To simplify notation,
we will define L0i := 0 for every bank i for any network L ∈ L.
(i) Bilateral compression: Given an initial network L˜ ∈ L, bilateral compression allows for
the reduction of bilateral exposures only. That is, the net obligations between banks i and
j must always be kept consistent with the initial network construction; additionally, all
obligations can only be reduced from their initial levels. As such, we can define bilateral
compression CB(L˜) as:
CB(L˜) :=
{
L ∈ L | ∀i, j : Lij − Lji = L˜ij − L˜ji, Lij ∈ [0, L˜ij ]
}
.
Bilateral compression is special insofar as the most the network can be compressed in this
way is defined by obligations: Lij := max{0, L˜ij − L˜ji}.
(ii) Conservative compression: Given an initial network L˜ ∈ L, conservative compression
allows for the reduction of cyclical exposures only. That is, the net obligations owed
around a directed cycle i → j1 → ... → jm → i must always be kept consistent with the
initial network construction; additionally, all obligations can only be reduced from their
initial levels. As defined in [19], this cyclical netting rule can be encoded by the fixed
net liabilities condition for every bank i. As such, we can define conservative compression
CC(L˜) as:
CC(L˜) :=
{
L ∈ L | ∀i, j :
n∑
k=0
[Lik − Lki] =
n∑
k=0
[L˜ik − L˜ki], Lij ∈ [0, L˜ij ]
}
.
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Figure 2: Example of cycle compression in different models. For conservative compression: α ∈ [0, 1]
and β ∈ [0, 10]. For rerouting: α ∈ (−∞, 1], β ∈ (−∞, 10] and α + β = 0. For nonconservative
compression: α ∈ (−∞, 1], β ∈ (−∞, 10] and α+ β ≥ 0.
(iii) Rerouting: Given an initial network L˜ ∈ L, rerouting allows for the rewiring of the entire
network. That is, all liabilities are redistributed throughout the system in such a way that
net and gross liabilities are kept constant. As such, we can define rerouting CR(L˜) as:
CR(L˜) :=
{
L ∈ L | ∀i, j :
n∑
k=0
[Lik − Lki] =
n∑
k=0
[L˜ik − L˜ki],
n∑
k=0
Lik =
n∑
k=0
L˜ik
}
.
(iv) Nonconservative compression: Given an initial network L˜ ∈ L, nonconservative com-
pression allows for the conservative compression of the rerouting problem. That is, for
every bank i, net liabilities are kept constant while gross liabilities are allowed to be re-
duced from the initial setup. As such, we can define nonconservative compression CN (L˜)
as:
CN (L˜) :=
{
L ∈ L | ∀i, j :
n∑
k=0
[Lik − Lki] =
n∑
k=0
[L˜ik − L˜ki],
n∑
k=0
Lik ≤
n∑
k=0
L˜ik
}
.
Sometimes one may also wish to fix the obligations Li0 owed to society; this is accomplished by
taking the intersection C(L˜) ∩ C0(L˜) where
C0(L˜) := {L ∈ Rn×(n+1)+ | ∀i : Li0 = L˜i0}.
We conclude this section by showing that the optimal compression problem for the constraint
sets of Example 2.3 are NP-hard in general. This result motivates us to consider specific settings
6
and algorithms used later in this work.
Theorem 2.4. The optimal network compression problem is NP-hard for the conservative,
rerouting and nonconservative compression models.
The proof of theorem is provided in Appendix A. By considering the network (relative
liabilities) entropy (f(L) = −∑ni=1∑nj=0 Lij∑n
k=0 Lik
log
(
Lij∑n
k=0 Lik
)
) as our objective function we
show that the optimal compression problem for each set of constraints is NP-hard. We prove this
by performing reduction from instances of the NP-complete subset sum problem [36]; defined
by a set of positive integers S = {k1, k2, . . . , kn} and an integer target value θ ∈ N, we wish to
know whether there exist a subset of these integers that sums up to θ. We show that this can
be viewed as a special case for the optimal network compression for each set of constraints.
Remark 2.5. In contrast to using the maximum entropy to find the missing liabilities as
in [39], we can consider the minimum entropy as our objective function for compression, see
e.g. [37, 44]. Indeed, the network maximizing the entropy will be close to the complete regular
network. On the other hand, the network minimizing the entropy would correspond to a sparse
network. So it makes sense to consider it as an objective function for compression; as this is
shown in [44], many of the known algorithms in pattern recognition can be characterized as
efforts to minimize the entropy. Consider for example the case of similar firms all having the
same total assets and liabilities (and without obligations to society). Then it is easy to check
that the network maximizing entropy will correspond to the complete regular network with
Lij∑n
k=1 Lik
= 1n−1 which gives f(L) = n log(n − 1). On the other hand, the network minimizing
the entropy would correspond to the (regular) ring which corresponds to f(L) = 0.
Remark 2.6. As the optimal compression problem (1) is generically nonconvex and NP-hard,
we cannot rely on a gradient descent method to converge to the global optimum. As such we
believe that machine learning tools and methods would be best for solving such problems in
general. For this paper, as will be utilized and validated in Section 4, we will implement a
genetic algorithm to solve the optimal control problem.
3 Systemic risk objective
In this section we wish to give a specific structure to the objective function f : L → R in our
optimal compression problem (1). Specifically, we wish to consider the network compression that
minimizes a systemic risk measure. These functions are decomposed as ρ◦Λ for a risk measure ρ
and an aggregation function Λ. Such functions were first introduced in [15,38] and are detailed
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below; these mappings also coincide with the “insensitive systemic risk measures” of [14,28]. In
order to present this setting, and for the remainder of this paper, we fix some probability space
(Ω,F ,P). Let L2 := L2(Ω,F ,P) denote those random variables that are square-integrable.
3.1 General stress scenario
In order to determine the health of a financial network, we first present a generic aggregation
function Λ in the following definition. These aggregation functions are mappings of two argu-
ments: the endowment for the banks and the liability network. The purpose of such a function
is to provide an aggregate statistic of the state of the financial system.
Definition 3.1. The mapping Λ : Rn+ × L → R is a aggregation function if it is a nonde-
creasing mapping in its first argument.
Example 3.2. Throughout this work we specifically consider three different aggregation func-
tions that are all fundamentally associated with the clearing mechanisms of [23, 40]. That is,
for recovery rates αx, αL ∈ [0, 1], the clearing payments are the maximal fixed point p(x, L) =
FIXp∈[0,L~1] Ψ(p;x, L) for
Ψi(p;x, L) =

∑n
j=0 Lij if xi +
∑n
j=1
Lji∑n
k=0 Ljk
pj ≥
∑n
j=0 Lij
αxxi + αL
∑n
j=1
Lji∑n
k=0 Ljk
pj if xi +
∑n
j=1
Lji∑n
k=0 Ljk
pj <
∑n
j=0 Lij .
As such, the clearing procedure Ψ implies: if bank i has nonnegative wealth xi+
∑n
j=1
Lji∑n
k=0 Ljk
pj−∑n
j=0 Lij ≥ 0 then it is solvent and its wealth is equal to its total assets minus its total liabilities;
if bank i has negative wealth xi +
∑n
j=1
Lji∑n
k=0 Ljk
pj −
∑n
j=0 Lij < 0 then it is defaulting and its
assets are reduced by the recovery rates αx, αL. From [40], we immediately recover a greatest
and least clearing solution to p = Ψ(p;x, L) within the lattice [0, L~1].
Let V (x, L) ∈ Rn denote the clearing wealths from an Eisenberg-Noe style clearing procedure
with endowments x ∈ Rn+ and L ∈ L denote the network of obligations, i.e.,
Vi(x, L) =

xi +
∑n
j=1
Lji∑n
k=0 Ljk
pj(x, L)−
∑n
j=0 Lij if pi(x, L) =
∑n
j=0 Lij
αxxi + αL
∑n
j=1
Lji∑n
k=0 Ljk
pj(x, L)−
∑n
j=0 Lij if pi(x, L) <
∑n
j=0 Lij .
(2)
With this clearing procedure, we consider the following three aggregation functions:
• Number of solvent banks: Λ#(x, L) := ∑ni=1 I{Vi(x,L)≥0}.
• System-wide wealth : ΛN (x, L) := ∑ni=1 Vi(x, L).
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• External wealth: Λ0(x, L) := ∑ni=1 Li0∑n
j=0 Lij
[∑n
j=0 Lij − Vi(x, L)−
]
.
Additionally, we need to consider a risk measure ρ in order to determine the risk that the
system is incurring. Such functions map random variables into capital requirements.
Definition 3.3. The mapping ρ : L2 → R is a risk measure if it satisfies the following
properties:
• normalization: ρ(0) = 0;
• monotonicity: ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ) if X ≥ Y a.s.; and
• translative: ρ(X +m) = ρ(X)−m for m ∈ R.
These risk measures may satisfy additional conditions, e.g., convexity or positive homogene-
ity.
Example 3.4. For the purposes of this work, we will focus on two standard risk measures
parameterized by γ ∈ [0, 1]:
• Value-at-Risk: ρVaRγ (Z) = − inf{z ∈ R | P(Z ≤ z) > 1− γ} =: −Z1−γ . If γ = 1 then we
recover the so-called worst-case risk measure: ρVaR1 (Z) = − ess inf Z =: ρWC(Z).
• Expected shortfall: ρESγ (Z) = −E[Z|Z ≤ Z1−γ ]. If γ = 0 then we recover the so-called
expectation risk measure: ρES0 (Z) = −E[Z] =: ρE(Z).
To measure the health of the financial system, we consider the systemic risk measures ρ ◦ Λ
for risk measure ρ and aggregation function Λ.
Definition 3.5. The mapping R : (L2)n × L → R is a systemic risk measure if it can be
decomposed into an aggregation function Λ and a risk measure ρ so that R(X,L) := ρ(Λ(X,L))
for every X ∈ (L2)n and L ∈ L.
Within the optimal compression problem (1), we specifically are interested in
f(L) := ρ(Λ(X,L))
for some fixed (random) endowments X ∈ (L2)n. That is, given a stress scenario X ∈ (L2)n,
we seek to find the optimal financial network (subject to compression constraints) such that the
systemic risk is minimized.
Remark 3.6. We wish to highlight two special cases which relate to the notions proposed in [1].
Fix X ∈ (L2)n such that Xi ≥ 0 a.s. for every bank i.
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(i) Consider the worst-case risk measure ρWC(Z) = − ess inf Z. In the notation from [1], L is
more resilient than Lˆ if and only if ρWC(Λ#(X,L)) ≤ ρWC(Λ#(X, Lˆ)).
(ii) Consider the expectation risk measure ρE(Z) = −E[Z]. In the notation from [1], L is more
stable than Lˆ if and only if ρE(Λ#(X,L)) ≤ ρE(Λ#(X, Lˆ)).
[1] presents these notions for symmetric systems of banks with i.i.d. Bernoulli shocks Xi.
Notably, under such conditions, the number of solvent banks provides the full information on
the health of the system; that is, any aggregation function that depends on (x, L) only through
the clearing wealths V (x, L), say Λ, provides the same ordering of liability networks L, Lˆ ∈ L
as Λ#:
ρ(Λ(X,L)) ≤ ρ(Λ(X, Lˆ)) ⇔ ρ(Λ#(X,L)) ≤ ρ(Λ#(X,L)).
We will revisit these problems, and compare our formulation with that with [1] further, in
Section 4.1 below.
3.2 Systematic shocks
While the systemic risk measures provide a meaningful objective to minimize in order to optimize
network compression, such constructs present additional computational challenges. Namely,
even a simple systemic risk measure such as ρE ◦ Λ0 requires an exponential (in number of
banks) time to compute explicitly [34]. Computationally, this can be overcome with Monte
Carlo simulations though that is subject to estimation errors. Herein we will impose systematic
shocks on the endowments on the banks, i.e., a comonotonic setting on the stress scenarios
X ∈ (L2)n, on an aggregate function based around the Eisenberg-Noe clearing notion. This is
in contrast to [1] in which shocks were i.i.d.
Throughout this section let C : R+ → Rn+ be a nondecreasing function and q be some
random variable such that C(q) ∈ (L2)n. The stress scenario is then defined by X = C(q). For
the purposes of this section we will focus on systemic risk measures constructed from Value-at-
Risk and expected shortfall (as defined in Example 3.4) and aggregate functions that depend
on the endowments and liability network through Eisenberg-Noe clearing wealths only. We
refer to Example 3.2 for a brief discussion of the Eisenberg-Noe clearing problem; importantly,
we define the clearing wealths V : Rn+ × L → Rn as a mapping from the endowments and
liability network. As detailed below, this setup allows for polynomial time computation of these
meaningful systemic risk measures. Much of this section follows from the logic of [9].
The systematic shock setting allows us to determine threshold market values q∗ such that
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banks are on the cusp of bankruptcy; in particular, we take the view that q denotes a systematic
factor. These values are presented in Definition 3.7 below. Though presented as a mathematical
formulation, [9, Proposition 4.4] presents an iterative algorithm for finding q∗ taking advantage
of the monotonicity of C.
Definition 3.7. Define q∗ : L → Rn+ so that q∗i (L) is the minimal value such that firm i is
solvent under the liability network L ∈ L, i.e.
q∗i (L) = inf {t ≥ 0 | Vi(C(t), L) ≥ 0} .
As noted above, we consider only those aggregate functions Λ whose dependence on the
endowments x ∈ Rn+ and liability network L ∈ L come through the Eisenberg-Noe clearing
wealths V (x, L), i.e., Λ(x, L) = Λ¯(V (x, L)) for every x ∈ Rn+ and L ∈ L for some monotonic
function Λ¯ : Rn → R. In this setting, the threshold values q∗ provide a quick heuristic for the
health of the financial system. Notably, if q∗i (L) ≥ q∗i (Lˆ) for every bank i for two financial
networks L, Lˆ ∈ L, then Λ(C(t), L) ≤ Λ(C(t), Lˆ) for any t ∈ R+ and, thus, ρ(Λ(C(q), L)) ≥
ρ(Λ(C(q), Lˆ)) for any nonnegative random variable q.
Before proceeding to the representations for the systemic risk measures under systematic
shocks, we need to introduce some notation that is provided in greater detail in [9]. Namely, we
want to consider a piecewise linear construction for the clearing wealths which follows from the
fictitious default algorithm of [40]. That is,
V (x, L) := ∆(I{V (x,L)<0}, L)x− δ(I{V (x,L)<0}, L)
for any endowment x ∈ Rn+ and liability network L ∈ L. In this piecewise linear construction,
the mappings ∆, δ are defined by:
∆(z, L) :=
(
I − (I − (1− αL) diag(z)) Π> diag(z)
)−1
(I − (1− αx) diag(z)) ,
δ(z, L) :=
(
I − (I − (1− αL) diag(z)) Π> diag(z)
)−1 [
I − (I − (1− αL) diag(z)) Π>
]
p¯,
p¯ := L~1, piij :=
Lij
p¯i
for z ∈ {0, 1}n denoting the set of defaulting institutions and L ∈ L is the liability network.
In particular, for our comonotonic setting, we can simplify these notions as only a subset of
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possible sets of defaulting institutions is possible, i.e., we define:
∆k(L) :=

∆(
∑n
i=1 I{q∗i (L)≤q∗k(L)}, L) if k = 1, 2, ..., n
I if k = 0,
δk(L) :=

δ(
∑n
i=1 I{q∗i (L)≤q∗k(L)}, L) if k = 1, 2, ..., n
(I −Π>)p¯ if k = 0.
Finally, we will use the notation that [k](L) is the index of the kth greatest value of q∗(L), i.e.,
q∗[1](L) ≥ q∗[2](L) ≥ ... ≥ q∗[n](L). To simplify following formulae, q∗[0](L) ≡ +∞ and q∗[n+1](L) ≡ 0
for every liability network L ∈ L.
We are now able to present the specific forms for the systemic risk measures under these
systematic shocks.
Proposition 3.8. Consider a systematic stress scenario described by a nonnegative random
variable q. Consider an aggregate function Λ whose dependence on the endowments x ∈ Rn+
and liability network L ∈ L come through the Eisenberg-Noe clearing wealths V (x, L), i.e.,
Λ(x, L) = Λ¯(V (x, L)) for every x ∈ Rn+ and L ∈ L for some monotonic function Λ¯ : Rn → R.
Let q1−γ ∈ R+ denote the (1 − γ)-quantile for q, then the Value-at-Risk for level γ ∈ [0, 1] can
be computed as
ρVaRγ (Λ(C(q), L)) = −Λ(C(q1−γ), L) = −Λ¯(∆[k](L)C(q1−γ)− δ[k](L))
if q1−γ ∈ [q∗[k+1](L), q∗[k](L)). Additionally, the expected shortfall for level γ ∈ [0, 1) can be
computed as
ρESγ (Λ(C(q), L)) = −
1
1− γ
n∑
k=0
E
[
Λ(C(q), L)I{q∈[q∗
[k+1]
(L),q∗
[k]
(L))∩[0,q1−γ ]}
]
= − 1
1− γ
n∑
k=0
E
[
Λ¯(∆[k](L)C(q)− δ[k](L))I{q∈[q∗
[k+1]
(L)∧q1−γ ,q∗[k](L)∧q1−γ)}
]
.
Proof. This follows directly from the construction of Value-at-Risk and expected shortfall and
the logic of Theorem 4.6 of [9].
We conclude this section with a consideration of a special case in which the expected short-
fall can be described in closed form for our example aggregation functions from Example 3.2.
Specifically, we consider a case in which the systematic factor follows a lognormal distribution.
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Corollary 3.9. Consider the setting of Proposition 3.8 in which q ∼ LogN(r − σ2/2, σ2),
C(t) := berT + st with b ∈ Rn and s ∈ Rn+, and Λ takes the form of the specific aggregate
functions provided in Example 3.2. Let Φ denote the CDF for the standard normal distribution
and Φ−1 is the inverse CDF. For fixed level γ ∈ [0, 1):
ρESγ (Λ
#(C(q), L)) = − 1
1− γ
n∑
k=1
k ×
(
Φ(−dγ2,[k](L))− Φ(−dγ2,[k+1](L))
)
,
ρESγ (Λ
N (C(q), L)) = − 1
1− γ
~1>
n∑
k=0
[
Aγk(L) +B
γ
k (L)
]
,
ρESγ (Λ
0(C(q), L)) = − 1
1− γ
n∑
i=1
L[i]0∑n
j=0 L[i]j
 n∑
j=0
L[i]j + e
>
[i]
n∑
k=[i]
[
Aγk(L) +B
γ
k (L)
] ,
where
Aγk(L) =
(
∆[k](L)be
rT − δ[k](L)
) (
Φ(−dγ2,[k](L))− Φ(−dγ2,[k+1](L))
)
,
Bγk (L) = ∆[k](L)s
(
Φ(−dγ1,[k](L))− Φ(−dγ1,[k+1](L))
)
,
dγ1,k(L) =
− log(q∗k(L) ∧ q1−γ) + (r + 12σ2)T
σ
√
T
, dγ2,k(L) = d
γ
1,k(L)− σ
√
T ,
q1−γ = exp((r − σ2/2)T + σ
√
TΦ−1(1− γ)).
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the form for the expected shortfall as provided in Propo-
sition 3.8.
4 Case studies
In this section we will consider two case studies to demonstrate the results of this work. As
mentioned in Remark 2.6, we implement a genetic algorithm to optimize (1). First, we will
present a small, 3 bank, financial system with heterogeneous (comonotonic) endowments. This
system allows us to easily present analytical results to validate the genetic algorithm we utilize
to consider optimal compression and rerouting. Additionally, this small system allows us to
investigate the robust fragility results of [1] in a different setting to determine if those results hold
for more general settings than presented in that work. Second, we calibrate a financial system
to the 2011 European Banking Authority stress testing data. With that system we compare
the original network, the fully compressed networks, and optimally compressed networks. As
found in [43], we find that network compression can increase systemic risk, but optimal network
compression can find significant improvements over the original network.
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Figure 3: Section 4.1: The generic network structure under consideration.
4.1 Three bank system
In [1] comparison of completely connected to ring structured networks was undertaken. In
that work, these networks were “symmetric” in that all banks were identical in assets and
liabilities, but with i.i.d. Bernoulli shocks. That work focuses on stability and resilience, i.e.,
w.r.t. ρWC ◦ Λ# and ρE ◦ Λ#, respectively, as provided in Remark 3.6. Notably, [1] determines,
under i.i.d. Bernoulli shocks, that the dense network is more stable if shocks are small, but
the sparse network is more stable if the shocks are large. We will explore this question further
with a consideration of a 3 bank system under systematic shocks that allows for: a completely
connected network and two ring networks. The general network structure is depicted in Figure 3.
For the sake of notational simplicity, we will consistently refer to bank i ∈ {1, 2, 3} as the bank
with endowment equal to xi × q. Without loss of generality we assume x1 ≤ x2 ≤ x3. We
additionally assume that either x1 6= x2, x1 6= x3, or x2 6= x3; if x1 = x2 = x3 then, due to the
comonotonic endowments inherent for a systematic shock, all rerouted networks have identical
systemic risk. We wish to note that both the net and gross liabilities of each bank is the same
in all network setups.
To approach the problem of studying optimal compression and rerouting for our 3 bank
system, we first want to study the minimal solvency prices q∗ for our three banks. In order to
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study these problems we impose the following netting conditions on the obligations:
L12 + L13 = L21 + L31, L21 + L23 = L12 + L13, L31 + L32 = L13 + L23.
Given the network provided in Figure 3 with the aforementioned netting conditions, these values
can be computed explicitly as:
q∗1 =
y
x1
q∗2 =

min{q∗1 , (L12+y)(L12+L13+y)−αLL12(L12+L13)αxL12x1+(L12+L13+y)x2 } if 1
min{q∗3 , p¯2(p¯1p¯3−α
2
LL13L31)−αL(L12(αLL23L31+p¯3L21)+L32(αLL21L13+p¯1L23))
αx(p¯3L12+αLL13L32)x1+(p¯1p¯3−α2LL13L31)x2+αx(p¯1L32+αLL31L12)x3
} if 1
q∗3 =

min{q∗2 , p¯3(p¯1p¯2−α
2
LL12L21)−αL(L13(αLL32L21+p¯2L31)+L23(αLL31L12+p¯1L32))
αx(p¯2L13+αLL12L23)x1+αx(p¯1L23+αLL21L13)x2+(p¯1p¯2−α2LL12L21)x3
} if 1
min{q∗1 , (L13+y)(L12+L13+y)−αLL13(L12+L13)αxL13x1+(L12+L13+y)x3 } if 1
where p¯1 = L12 + L13 + y, p¯2 = L21 + L23 + y, p¯3 = L31 + L32 + y and
1 :([1− αL][L12 + L13] + y)[L12x3 − L13x2] + y(L12 + L13 + y)[x3 − x2] + αxy(L13 − L12)x1 ≥ 0,
1 :([1− αL][L12 + L13] + y)[L12x3 − L13x2] + y(L12 + L13 + y)[x3 − x2] + αxy(L13 − L12)x1 < 0.
These values q∗ allow us to explicitly compute the statistics on the network as discussed in
Section 3.2.
To make these defaulting price levels more explicit, we wish to consider 4 simplified networks
with xi = i and p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯3 ≤ 1 for all banks. These networks and resultant q∗ are:
(i) Completely connected: Let Lij = 12 for all i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, 3} with y > 0. First we
note that, by construction, it must be that q∗1 ≥ q∗2 ≥ q∗3 in this setup for any choice of
bankruptcy costs and obligations to society. For notation to allow for easier comparisons
later on, we will denote these thresholds as qCC1 , qCC2 , qCC3 .
qCC1 = y,
qCC2 = min{qCC1 ,
2y2 + 3y + (1− αL)
4y + 4 + αx
},
qCC3 = min{qCC2 ,
2(y2 + (2− αL2 )y + (1− αL))
3(2y + 2 + αx − αL }.
(ii) Ring 123: Let L12 = L23 = L31 = 1 and L13 = L32 = L21 = 0 with y > 0. First we
note that, by construction, it must be that q∗1 ≥ q∗2 ≥ q∗3 in this setup for any choice of
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bankruptcy costs and obligations to society. For notation to allow for easier comparisons
later on, we will denote these thresholds as q1231 , q1232 , q1233 .
q1231 = y,
q1232 = min{q1231 ,
y2 + 2y + (1− αL)
2y + 2 + αx
},
q1233 = min{q1232 ,
y3 + 3y2 + 3y + (1− α2L)
3y2 + (6 + 2αx)y + (3 + αx(2 + αL))
}.
(iii) Ring 132: Let L12 = L23 = L31 = 0 and L13 = L32 = L21 = 1 with y > 0. For notation
to allow for easier comparisons later on, we will denote these thresholds as q1321 , q1322 , q1323 .
q1321 = y,
q1322 =

y
2 if y ≥ 12
(
1− αx +
√
(1− αx)2 + 8(1− αL)
)
min{q1323 , y
3+3y2+3y+(1−α2L)
2y2+(4+3αx)y+(2+αx(3+αL))
} if y < 12
(
1− αx +
√
(1− αx)2 + 8(1− αL)
)
,
q1323 =

min{q1322 , y
3+3y2+3y+(1−α2L)
3y2+(6+αx)y+(3+αx(1+2αL))
} if y ≥ 12
(
1− αx +
√
(1− αx)2 + 8(1− αL)
)
min{q1321 , y
2+2y+(1−αL)
3y+3+αx
} if y < 12
(
1− αx +
√
(1− αx)2 + 8(1− αL)
)
.
(iv) Compressed: Let Lij = 0 for all i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, 3} with y > 0. For notation to allow for
easier comparison later on, we will denote these thresholds as q01 , q02 , q03 .
q01 = y, q
0
2 =
y
2
, q03 =
y
3
.
As q∗1 = y for any network construction in this setup, we will compare these 4 networks for
the defaulting thresholds for banks 2 and 3 only. Figure 4 displays the default thresholds, in
excess of the fully compressed system, for the 2nd and 3rd bank (max{q∗2 , q∗3} and min{q∗2 , q∗3}
respectively) with αx = αL = 0.5. First, and notably, the default thresholds are lowest in the
fully compressed system. This is further shown in Figure 7c in which the optimally compressed
network with Λ# is the fully compressed one. However, for comparison to [1], we also want
to investigate the rerouting problem. By investigating q∗ we can compare the stability and
resilience of financial networks to systematic Bernoulli shocks. As displayed in Figure 4, and
as can be verified analytically (for any αx, αL ∈ [0, 1]), qCC2 ≤ q1232 for any y ≥ 0. That is for
“small” shocks the completely connected system is always more stable and resilient than Ring
123. For “large” shocks with small enough obligations to society y, we find that qCC3 ≤ q1233 ; for
larger obligations to society the opposite ordering is found. That is, for “large” shocks the total
16
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Figure 4: Section 4.1: Impact of obligations to society y to the default thresholds q∗.
obligations to society can alter the stability and resilience ordering between these two networks.
This, generally, coincides with the robust fragility notion from [1] in which the completely
connected system was more robust to small shocks but more fragile to large shocks. In contrast,
the opposite relations hold between the completely connected network and Ring 132; that is,
we find that the ring is more stable and resilient for “small” shocks (qCC2 ≥ max{q1322 , q1323 })
but the ordering for “large” shocks depends on the obligations to society y (for small enough
y then qCC3 ≥ min{q1322 , q1323 }, for large enough y then qCC3 ≤ min{q1322 , q1323 }). As systematic
shocks and heterogeneous financial networks are vital to the consideration of financial stability,
optimal compression and rerouting take on new significance since the typical heuristics in the
literature will not hold generally.
We now wish to validate the performance of our genetic algorithm for finding the optimal
networks. We will accomplish this by studying the expectation risk measure ρE with all three
of our sample aggregation functions Λ#,ΛN ,Λ0. The validation is accomplished by comparing
the results of the genetic algorithm with those using an interior point algorithm (initialized
at Lij = 12 for all i 6= j). We also wish to compare these optimal networks with the 4 sample
networks (completely connected, 2 rings, and the fully compressed system) to investigate the op-
timality of these heuristic constructions. In Figure 6, we consider the optimal rerouting problem
under change of obligations to society y; in Figure 7, we consider the optimal nonconservative
compression (with fixed obligations to society) problem under change of obligations to society y.
First, and foremost, our genetic algorithm accurately matches or even outperforms the optimal
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Figure 5: Section 4.1: Detailed visualization of the optimal rerouting problem.
network using an interior point algorithm (as seen in optimal nonconservative compression with
Λ0). Further, though the heuristic networks coincide with these optimal risk levels in specific
cases, they do not uniformly perform as well as the optimal networks. Most interesting is the
consideration of Λ0 in which the optimally compressed network nearly coincides with the optimal
rerouting problem for low y.
Consider now the optimal compression and rerouting problems for this three bank system.
As above, throughout this example, we will fix αx = αL = 0.5 for simplicity of comparison.
First, we will consider the optimal rerouting problem to generalize the notions from [1]. In
order to ease the notation for the rerouting problem (with gross obligations of 1 + y for each of
the three banks) let L12 = L23 = L31 = λ and L13 = L32 = L21 = 1 − λ. First, for the most
direct comparison, in Figure 5a we consider how modifying λ affects the defaulting thresholds
q∗ (with y = 1). By inspection the most stable and resilient system is clearly for some small,
but strictly positive, λ. These optimally stable networks are described in Figure 5b; such a
system is considered in which q ∼ LogN(−σ22 , σ2) with σ = 20%. Notably, the optimal network
depends on the obligations to society y.
4.2 European banking system
In this section we demonstrate how our comonotonic approach with genetic algorithm for op-
timization can be applied in a larger financial network consisting of n = 87 banks to come
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Figure 6: Section 4.1: Validation of the optimal rerouting problem.
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from the 2011 European Banking Authority EU-wide stress tests.1 There are several previous
empirical studies based on this dataset (see, e.g., [16,30]) and we calibrate this system by taking
the same approach as [26]. We consider a stylized balance sheet for each bank with only three
types of assets and liabilities. The total interbank assets for bank i is
∑n
j=1 Lji while the total
interbank liabilities is
∑n
j=1 Lij . The external risk-free assets for bank i is denoted by bi and
the external risky assets is denoted by si. On the other hand, the external liabilities for bank i
is Li0 and the bank i is endowed with capital Ci.
Note that the EBA dataset only provides the total assets Ai, capital Ci, and interbank lia-
bilities
∑n
j=1 Lij for each bank i. Therefore, we will make the following simplifying assumptions
similar to [16,26,33]. We assume that the external (risky) assets are the difference between the
total assets and interbank assets. The external obligations owed to the societal node (denoted
by Li0) will be assumed equal to the total liabilities less the interbank liabilities and capital.
Further, we assume that the interbank assets is equal to the interbank liabilities for all banks,
i.e.,
∑n
j=1 Lij =
∑n
j=1 Lji for all i = 1, . . . , n. Under these assumptions, the remainder of our
stylized balance sheet can be constructed by setting
bi = 0.8× (Ai −
n∑
j=1
Lij), si = 0.2× (Ai −
n∑
j=1
Lij),
and,
Li0 = Ai −
n∑
j=1
Lij − Ci, p¯i = Li0 +
n∑
j=1
Lij ,
which will guarantees that firm i’s net worth is equal to its capital, i.e., Ci = Ai − p¯i.
We will also need to consider the full nominal liabilities matrix L ∈ R87×87+ and not just
the total interbank assets and liabilities. To achieve this, we will use the MCMC methodology
of [30] which allows for randomized sparse structures to construct the full nominal liabilities
matrix consistent with the total interbank assets and liabilities. Remark that as this example is
only for illustrative purposes, we will consider only a single calibration of the interbank network.
The remaining parameters of the system are calibrated as follows. We specify the systematic
factor as a lognormal distribution with parameters q ∼ LogN(r − σ22 , σ2) described in millions
of euros. Since during the period over which this data was collected, central banks were setting
a low interest rate environment, we estimate that the risk-free interest rate is r = 0. Finally,
from comparisons to annualized historical volatility of European markets in 2011, the volatility
1Due to complications with the calibration methodology, we only consider 87 of the 90 institutions. DE029, LU45,
and SI058 were not included in this analysis.
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Bilateral Conservative Nonconservative-0 Nonconservative
Maximally Compressed: 2717.449 6749.574 6749.574 6749.574
Optimally Compressed: -0.033 -0.033 -1639.660 -5339.976
Table 1: Section 4.2: Improvements in ρES80% ◦ Λ0 from the initial network L in millions of euros
(i.e., negative values indicate cost savings).
of the risky asset is estimated to be σ = 20%.
For the purposes of this example, we consider clearing based on the pure Eisenberg-Noe
mechanism, i.e., with full recovery in case of default (αx = αL = 1). We will consider two
systemic risk measures to optimize over: the 80% expected shortfall of the payments to society
(ρES80% ◦ Λ0) and the number of solvent banks (ρES80% ◦ Λ#). Herein we compare two types of
compression: “maximally compressed” corresponds to compressed network that removes as much
excess liabilities from the network as possible (as is considered in [19]) whereas “optimally
compressed” attempts to minimize the appropriate systemic risk measure. These two types of
compression are then compared over 4 possible compression scenarios: bilateral compression
(CB(L)), conservative compression (CC(L)), nonconservative compression with fixed obligations
to society (CN (L) ∩ C0(L)), and nonconservative compression (CN (L)). In particular, we wish
to compare the systemic risk exhibited by the original network to those found in either the
maximally compressed or optimally compressed scenarios. These results are provided in Tables 1
and 2.
As shown in Table 1, under maximal compression, the more relaxed the constraints the worse
the expected outcome for society in the 20% tail event; however, by using optimal compression,
the systemic risk can be improved significantly under compression. Notably, the optimal bilat-
eral and conservative compression only find marginal improvements in the payments to society,
whereas the maximally compressed versions increase systemic risk by billions of euros. The non-
conservative compressions find substantial benefits (over e1.6 and e5.3 billion) if implemented
optimally, but nearly e6.75 billion euros of cost when maximally applied without consideration
for systemic effects.
In contrast, as shown in Table 2, the optimal and maximal compression algorithms provide
identical systemic risk when attempting to minimize the expected number of defaults in the
20% tail events. In this scenario conservative compression outperforms bilateral compression
and provides all the benefits of nonconservative compression; in such a setting we therefore find
conservative compression the best as it allows all banks to remain with their original intended
counterparties.
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Bilateral Conservative Nonconservative-0 Nonconservative
Maximally Compressed: -0.599 -2.196 -2.196 -2.196
Optimally Compressed: -0.599 -2.196 -2.196 -2.196
Table 2: Section 4.2: Improvements in ρES80% ◦ Λ# from the initial network L in # of banks (i.e.,
negative values indicate fewer bank defaults).
5 Conclusion
In this work we presented a general formulation for the optimal network compression problem
and found it to be NP-hard. We then focused on an objective function taking the form of
systemic risk measures. In particular, we consider systematic shocks in order to find tractable
analytical forms for these systemic risk measures. Such scenarios allow us to generalize the work
of, e.g., [1] to consider the robustness of various network topologies.
As the optimal network compression problem is nonconvex and NP-hard in general, the
choice of optimization algorithms is of great interest. This is doubly so if idiosyncratic shocks
are introduced as the computation of the systemic risk measures can be NP-hard as well in such
a setting (see, e.g., [9,34]). In this work we implemented a genetic algorithm to search for global
minima networks. We leave further research on choosing optimization procedures, especially
machine learning methods, for future research.
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A Proof of Theorem 2.4
We will consider the minimum relative liability entropy as the objective function:
f(L) = −
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
piij log(piij), (3)
where piij =
Lij
p¯i
denotes the relative liability of firm i toward firm j. We refer to Remark 2.5
for the interpretation of this objective function for network compression.
Consider an instance of the NP-complete subset sum problem [36], defined by a set of
positive integers S = {k1, k2, . . . , kn} and an integer target value θ ∈ N, we wish to know
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Figure 8: Reduction to subset sum NP-complete problem for optimal rerouting and nonconserva-
tive compression.
whether there exist a subset of these integers that sums up to θ. We will show that this can be
viewed as a special case for the optimal network compression in the case of network rerouting,
nonconservative and conservative compression models.
Let K = k1 + k2 + · · · + kn and α = θ/K ∈ (0, 1) (otherwise, the subset sum decision is
trivial). Given an instance of the subset sum problem, we define a corresponding instance of
the optimal rerouting compression by considering the bipartite network of Figure 8 with two
core nodes {C1, C2} on one side and n periphery nodes {P1, . . . , Pn} on the other side. We set
the initial liabilities L˜ as L˜Pi,C1 = αki and L˜Pi,C2 = (1−α)ki for all i = 1, . . . , n. Note that the
total interbank receivables for C1 and C2 is respectively θ and K − θ, while the total interbank
liabilities is zero for C1 and C2. On the other hand, for all i = 1, . . . , n, the total interbank
liabilities for node Pi is ki while the total interbank receivables is zero.
The optimal rerouting compression model is thus equivalent to finding xi ∈ [0, 1] for LPi,C1 =
xiki and LPi,C2 = (1− xi)ki which satisfies
∑n
i=1 xiki = θ, and minimizes
f(L) = f(x1, . . . , xn) =−
n∑
i=1
xi log (xi)−
n∑
i=1
(1− xi) log (1− xi) .
Since x log(x) + (1 − x) log(1 − x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1] with equality only for x = 0, 1, we
infer f(x1, . . . , xn) ≥ 0, and the equality holds if and only if there exists xi ∈ {0, 1} such that∑n
i=1 xiki = θ. Hence, if the solution to optimal rerouting compression model corresponds to
f(L) = 0 then there exist a subset of S that sums up to θ.
Further, note that in the bipartite network of Figure 8, the optimal nonconservative com-
pression is equivalent to optimal rerouting. Hence, the same argument shows that the optimal
nonconservative compression is NP-hard.
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Figure 9: Reduction to subset sum problem for optimal conservative compression model.
Hence, it only remains to prove the case of conservative compression model. Given an in-
stance of the subset sum problem, we define a corresponding instance of the optimal conserva-
tive compression by considering the network of Figure 9 with three core nodes {C0, C1, C2} and
n periphery nodes {P1, . . . , Pn}. We set the initial liabilities L˜ as L˜Pi,C1 = ki and L˜Pi,C2 = ki
for all i = 1, . . . , n. Note that the net interbank liabilities for C1 and C2 is respectively −θ and
−(K − θ). On the other hand, for all i = 1, . . . , n, the net interbank liabilities for node Pi is ki.
Further, for the node C0 the net interbank liabilities is zero.
It is then easy to show that the minimum relative liability entropy can be found by setting
LC0,Pi = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n and consequently, LC1,C0 = 0 and LC2,C0 = 0. The optimization
problem is thus equivalent to find xi ∈ [0, 1] which gives LPi,C1 = xiki and LPi,C2 = (1− xi)ki
for all i = 1, . . . , n. The xis should satisfy
∑n
i=1 xiki = θ and minimizes again
f(x1, . . . , xn) =−
n∑
i=1
xi log (xi)−
n∑
i=1
(1− xi) log (1− xi) ≥ 0.
The equality holds if and only if there exists xi ∈ {0, 1} such that
∑n
i=1 xiki = θ. We conclude
that if the solution to optimal conservative compression model corresponds to f(L) = 0, then
there exist a subset of S that sums up to θ, which completes the proof.
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